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Much has been written concerning the due process requirements for
the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.' The prob-
lem, however, is to a great extent academic in Pennsylvania where,
as Mr. Justice O'Brien of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court commented
in a recent case, the legislature has "been erring too much on the side
of safety."' 2 Justice O'Brien, in a case which dealt with a limited long-
arm statute of Pennsylvania, recognized that currently a "due process
gap" exists, namely that the legislature has failed to pass long-arm
statutes which are as broad as due process would permit. 3 It is the
purpose of this comment to examine the serious "gap" that exists and
its consequences to the Pennsylvania resident.
In order to exercise jurisdiction over a person or a corporation a
court must meet two jurisdictional tests. First, there must be statutory
authority for the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant. 4 Second, the imposition of jurisdiction by the state over a
particular defendant must fall within the bounds set out by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The second test-the
requirements of due process-will be dealt with first since it serves as
the outer limit beyond which no state can proceed in its exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
THE OUTER LIMIT-DUE PROCESS
"Minimum Contacts"
Any discussion of the modern demands of the Due Process Clause
on in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants must nec-
1. Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960)
[Hereinafter cited as Developments-Jurisdiction]; Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533 [Hereinafter cited
as Currie]; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1957); Seidelson, Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes,
6 Duq. L. REV. 221 (1968); Twerski, A Return To Jurisdictional Due Process-A Case for
the Vanishing Defendant, 8 DuQ. L. REV. 220 (1970) [Hereinafter cited as Twerskil.
2. Messick v. Gordon, 434 Pa. 30, 34, 252 A.2d 627, 630 (1969) discussed at length in the
text at note 91, infra.
3. Id. The "due process gap" is noted at 7 DUQ. L. REV. 138, 143 (1968).
4. Heaney v. Mauch Chunk Borough, 322 Pa. 487, 490, 185 A. 732, 733 (1936) provides
that in personam service must be made within a state "unless a statute clearly and definitely
manifests that a different method as to service has been promulgated by the legislature."
320
Vol. 8: 319, 1970
Comments
essarily begin with the landmark case of International Shoe Company
v. State of Washington.5 Prior to International Shoe, jurisdiction over
foreign corporations was asserted on the fictional bases of presence 6
and implied consent.7 International Shoe abolished the fictions and
squarely faced the issue of due process. If it failed to give definitive
answers to cover all situations, it was only because the very nature of
due process renders such a task impossible. It is inescapable that the
often nebulous demands of due process (essentially a test of fairness)
be examined upon the merits of each case.8 Thus the test set forth
by the court was as precise as any that might have been formulated:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." 9 [Emphasis added.]
In deciding whether the "minimum contacts" test is met, a court
should look to the "quality and nature of the activity" and its rela-
tion to the "fair and orderly administration of the laws."'10 Addition-
ally, an "estimate of the inconveniences" to the defendant who is to
conduct the defense is "relevant.""
Essentially, four basic factual patterns are possible with a non-
resident defendant and all were alluded to by the court. The chart,
Figure 1, illustrates the possible fact situations.'
2
5. 326 U.S. 310.(1945).
6. Philadelphia and Reading Railway v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
7. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1856). For an extended discussion of
the prior law see Developments-Jurisdiction at 919.
8. Kurland, supra note 1. But see, Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents and
Montana's New Rule 4B, 24 MONT. L. Rav. 3 (1962) where it is suggested that due process
is not met unless three requirements are satisfied: (1) there must be a governmental interest
in providing the forum for the litigation; (2) the forum must figure favorably with regard
to trial convenience; and (3) the defendant must have done some purposeful act by which
he has attained the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum.
9. 326 U.S. at 316.
10. Id. at 317.
11. Id. But see, Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 919, 135
N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965), which states that "[c]onvenience ...is not in any event a good
test . . . but so far as it has any weight here, the argument is at least as available to the
plaintiff .. "
12. We are unable to identify the originator of this chart, but our source is the class
notes of Associate Professor Aaron D. Twerski who teaches conflict of laws at Duquesne
University School of Law. It is, admittedly, an oversimplification, but is nevertheless
valuable in outlining the area.
The discussion of due process which follows assumes a sufficiently broad jurisdictional







Cause of Action Related Cause of Action Unrelated
I. State can take II. Under certain
jurisdiction in all circumstances state
cases. can take jurisdiction.
Ill. Under certain IV. State cannot
circumstances state can take jurisdiction.
take jurisdiction.
FIGURE 1. Jurisdictional Due Process Factual Patterns
I. Continuous Activity, Action Related
The court easily disposed of the situation where defendant conducts
continuous activity within a state and the cause of action is related to
the activity. In personam jurisdiction in such a case "has never been
doubted."'13
II. Continuous Activity, Action Unrelated
In this category a nonresident defendant is conducting continuous
activity within the forum state but the cause of action is unrelated to
these activities. International Shoe gave no clear indication as to the
solution, but intimated that jurisdiction would depend on the "nature
and quality" of defendant's acts and "the circumstance of their com-
mission.' 4 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
15
the Supreme Court found that the "continuous and systematic" ac-
tivities of the foreign corporation made it proper for the Ohio courts
to assert jurisdiction if they wished to do so though the cause of action
sued upon was unrelated to the defendant's Ohio activities.
However, continuous activity within a state will not always serve as
a basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In Fisher Gover-
13. 326 U.S. at 317 where it is stated that "'Presence' in the state . . . has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on.
14. 326 U.S. at 318.
15. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Here the fact situation was unique. A nonresident sued a
Philippine corporation in Ohio on a cause of action which neither arose in the jurisdic-
tion nor was related to defendant's activities there. Defendant, a South Pacific mine owner,
had its operations halted during the Japanese occupation. The president, a principal share-
holder, was carrying on the firm's operations from an Ohio office at the time of the suit.
Ohio was the only forum reasonably available to the plaintiff. Developments-Jurisdiction
at 932.
In Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961) the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court indicated that it would assert jurisdiction in a fact situation similar to
Perkins but was unable to do so because of the limited Pennsylvania long-arm statute.
See text at note 57, infra, for the affect of the 1963 amendments to the Business Corpora-
tion Law which overrule Rufo.
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nor Company v. Superior Court6 defendant was an Iowa corporation
doing business in California through manufacturers' agents. The cause
of action in the California court was for wrongful death and personal
injuries which had occurred in Idaho. In holding that jurisdiction
could not be assumed, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court listed the following as relevant factors:
The interests of the state in providing a forum for its residents,
... or in regulating the business involved.. . ; the relative availa-
bility of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in
one place rather than another . . . ; the ease of access to an al-
ternative forum . . . ; the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and
conflicting adjudications ... ; and the extent to which the causes
of action arose out of defendant's local activities .... 17 [Citations
omitted.]
III. Isolated Activity, Action Related
This category must be further divided between tort and contract
actions. It appears to be well settled that jurisdiction will be allowed
where a tort resulted from the nonresident defendant's isolated or
sporadic activity conducted within the forum state.' 8
A suit on an isolated contract, on the other hand, presents some
difficulty for the contract is likely to have contacts with more than
one state. The place of execution and the place of performance may
not coincide and neither may coincide to the place or places of nego-
tiation.
An important case and one often referred to as the "high water
mark" in the Supreme Court's expansion of the permissible basis of
in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents is McGee v. International
16. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1 (1959).
17. Id. at 225, 347 P.2d at 3, 4.
18. In Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), cited
with apparent approval in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957), jurisdiction was based upon a "single act" statute which gave Vermont courts
jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a negligent act within the state. In Rosen-
blatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1 (1965), Mr. Justice Goldberg acting as a
single justice, while not deciding the constitutionality of the "single tort" statutes,
recognized that such statutes have been uniformly upheld in situations where defendant
has committed a tortious act within the forum. He quoted Currie, supra note 1, at 540,
which provides:
[T]he constitutionality of this assertion of jurisdiction, today, could only be doubted
by those determined to oppose the clear trend of the decisions. This situation is exactly
that of the nonresident-motorists statutes, which were long ago upheld, except that
the highways are not directly involved. It is now clear, if it was ever in doubt, that the
nonresident-motorist cases were not really based on "consent," but on the interest
of the forum State and the fairness of trial there to the defendant.
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Life Insurance Company.19 There jurisdiction was allowed though the
only contact that a Texas insurer had with the State of California was
the mailing of an offer of reinsurance to a California resident who ac-
cepted and thereafter mailed the insurance premiums to Texas.
. McGee seemed to go a long way in allowing personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant for now a single transaction of business
served to satisfy the requirements of due process.2 0 However, just six
months after the McGee decision the Supreme Court in Hanson v.
Denckla2l indicated that some limitations on a state's jurisdictional
powers were still required by due process. There a trust agreement was
entered into by a Pennsylvania domiciliary and a Delaware trustee.
The Pennsylvania domiciliary moved to Florida and continued to
correspond with the trustee regarding the administration of the trust.
In holding that Florida could not exercise long-arm jurisdiction over
the Delaware trustee, and hence could not litigate the validity of the
trust, Mr. Chief Justice Warren for a majority of five said:
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.2 2 [Emphasis added.]
IV. Isolated Activity, Action Unrelated
The court quickly disposed of this category in International Shoe,
stating that:
it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of
activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to
subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activi-
ties there.2
19. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
20. It has been argued that McGee cannot be sustained as a precedent of general
applicability for it involved an area-insurance-in which the states have a special
regulatory interest. Developments-Jurisdiction at 928. Only one circuit has adopted this
view.. Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959). Contra,
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1963). Professor Currie argues, Currie
at 549, that he
cannot see why a State is any less strongly concerned to insure that its injured residents
recover compensation from those who injure them than from those who promise to
pay for injuries caused by others.
See also Note, 51 VA. L. Rav. 719, 727 (1965) where it is asserted that the Due Process
Clause could not, in any event, be emasculated by any special state interest.
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
22. Id. at 253.
23. 326 U.S. at 317.
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The court added that a burden to defend in such a situation would
"lay too great and unreasonable burden on the corporation to comport
with due process.
2 4
Foreign Act, Local Injury
A category of cases that falls within boxes I or III of Figure 1 (cause
of action related to either isolated or continuous activity) involves
situations where the defendant, by its out-of-state activities, has caused
an injury within the state. This is the problem often raised in a prod-
ucts liability case.
The exact requirements of due process in products liability cases
have consitently puzzled state and federal courts. Primarily responsible
has been the Supreme Court's language in Hanson v. Denckla that
defendant must "purposefully [avail] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."
'25
There should be little difficulty in asserting jurisdiction where
goods are shipped directly into a state by a nonresident manufacturer
and sent through the distribution process for in such cases defendant
has voluntarily entered the state and, in the Hanson language, has
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of its laws.2 6
Where a defendant regularly conducts business within a state, juris-
diction will be allowed and it will generally be of no significance that
the alleged negligent act occurred outside the forum.
27
However, in products lability situations where the defendant's only
contact with the forum is that his product has caused an injury within
the forum itself, the courts and writers are in disagreement as to what
type of "minimum contacts" are necessary to satisfy the due process
clause.28 In an exhaustive opinion thoroughly examining both the
cases' and the writers' approach to this problem, the Arizona Supreme
Court in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corporation29 concluded
that Hanson v. Denckla "was an unusual situation in which the court
achieved substantial justice" but that the decision "is of questionable
value as a precedent regarding the problem of personal jurisdiction
24. Id.
25. 357 U.S. at 253.
26. Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961).
27. Bush v. Service Plastics, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 136 (D. Ohio 1966).
28. See generally, Twerski, supra note 1.
29. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
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over non-resident defendants." 30 In Phillips defendant's only contact
with the state was the presence of a single allegedly defective product
which it manufactured and which the court assumed was sold to plain-
tiff outside the state. After the injury defendant's products were shown
to be present for sale within the state. The court recognized that other
jurisdictions have found it fair to assume jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent defendants in such situations, but constrained by the language in
Hanson they have adopted a test of foreseeability. However, the Ari-
zona court refused to be bound to such a test and relying upon the
test set forth in International Shoe framed the issue in terms of
whether or not defendant's contacts with the state made it fundamen-
tally fair to assert jurisdiction. It listed the following factors to be con-
sidered by the trial court:
First, the court should consider the nature and size of the manu-
facturer's business. As the probability of the product entering in-
terstate commerce and the size or volume of the business increase,
the fairness of making the manufacturer defend in the plaintiff's
forum increases. Second, the court should consider the economic
independence of the plantiff. A poor man is likely to become a
public ward if his injuries are uncompensated. Moreover, he may
not be able to afford a trip to another jurisdiction to institute suit.
. . . Third, the court should consider the nature of the cause of
action including the applicable law and the practical matters of
trial. As the number of local witnesses increases and their avail-
ability to travel decreases, it seems fairer to make the manufac-
turer defend in the plaintiff's forum.31
This, briefly sketched, represents the demands of due process im-
posed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is essential to point out that
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe applies to private
as well as corporate persons insofar as it broadens the scope of long-
arm jurisdiction.
3 2
30. Id. at 254, 413 P.2d at 735.
31. Id. at 257, 413 P.2d at 738.
32. Mr. justice Traynor's statement in Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 831,
345 P.2d 921, 924-5 (1959) that the "rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited
to foreign corporations, and both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction over
nonresident motorists make it clear that the minimum contacts test for jurisdiction applies
to individuals as well as for corporations" is in accord with the position taken by the
American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAws §§ 84-86 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1956), and is embodied in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT §§ 1.01, 1.03. Query whether the "minimum contacts" test would invalidate "tag"
service where defendant's only contact with the state is his presence there.
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THE LONG-ARM IN PENNSYLVANIA
Following International Shoe many state legislatures drafted statutes
to take advantage of the broader standard of due process established
for in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents.3 3 Without a suffi-
ciently broad statute, of course, a state cannot assert jurisdiction. The
Pennsylvania legislature suprisingly failed to react in any meaningful
way. Prior to International Shoe, Pennsylvania had legislation pro-
viding for service of process over (1) nonresident motorists,3 4 (2) air-
craft owners or operators involved in an accident "within or above"
the state, 5 and (3) the "owner, tenant, or user" of "involved" real
estate.A6 In apparent response to International Shoe, the legislature
amended the non-resident motorist and aircraft owners statutes. In
addition, it passed statutes providing for long-arm jurisdiction over
(1) certain distributors of "malt or brewed beverages,"37 (2) the owner
or operator of a water vessel, 3s (3) unauthorized insurers,39 and (4) un-
registered corporations.
40
The Pennsylvania long-arm statutes as a whole are severly limited
in nature and thus fail to encompass the permissible scope of jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents in terms of the Due Process Clause. The
motorist, aircraft, beverage, insurance, and vessel statutes purport to
cover extremely limited situations and have thus given the courts little
difficulty in application. Similarly, the real estate statute purports to
deal with a limited situation, but has been the source of some con-
troversy as attempts have been made to broaden its scope by interpreta-
tion. These statutes serve as the only means for attaining long-arm
33. The following include in part those states which have adopted a comprehensive
long-arm such as the statute proposed herein: New York, Rhode Island, New Jersey,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Maine, Oklahoma, Massachu-
setts and Washington. The following states, unlike Pennsylvania, have a "single act" statute
for corporations: West Virginia, Vermont, Ohio, Maryland, and Minnesota. This list is
by no means exclusive.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 2001 (1929). It has been amended several times, most
recently in 1959, and is quoted in the Appendix.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1410 (1935) provides for service on an aircraft "operator or
owner" following any "accident or collision" which is "within or above" the Common-
wealth. It can be found in the Appendix.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1937) which is discussed in detail infra at note 79
et. seq. and is quoted in the Appendix.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 338 (1961), quoted in the Appendix.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 336 (1959), quoted in the Appendix, which is also limited
to tort actions occurring within the state. Leport v. White River Barge Line, 215 F. Supp.
220 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1005.2 (1949), quoted in the Appendix.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011 (1951). It is provided in the Appendix.
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jurisdiction over a non-corporate entity. The corporate enactment,
repealed, re-enacted and amended three times since its inception, has
been an even more fruitful source of litigation.
In the remainder of this comment the restrictive provisions of the
corporate and real estate statutes will be examined in detail to reveal
their inadequacies and to suggest the legislative reform needed to in-
sure that courts in this state are able to exert the full range of juris-
diction that the Due Process Clause permits. This, it is submitted, is
necessary to eliminate the current hardships that are imposed upon
the Pennsylvania plaintiff who is not only deprived of a convenient
forum but may also be denied substantive justice at the hands of a
foreign court which may choose to apply its own law or the law of
another state thereby reducing or eliminating plaintiff's chances of
recovery.
THE CORPORATE "LONG-ARM"-SECTION 2011
1851 to 1951-"Doing Business"
Before any statutory direction in the form of "long-arm" jurisdic-
tion 4' existed in Pennsylvania, the limitations for exercising jurisdic-
tion over nonresident corporations "doing business" in this state were
laid down in Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R.R. Company42 which
held that (1) the corporation must be present in the state; (2) by an
agent; (3) duly authorized to represent it in the state; (4) the business
transacted therein must be by or through such agent; (5) the business
engaged in must be sufficient in quantity and quality; and (6) there
must be a statute making such corporation amendable to suit.43 The
41. By the Act of April 8, 1851, P.L. 353 § 6 suit against a corporation could be brought
in any county where it had an agency or transacted business. Service had to be made upon
an agent of the corporation.
Today, Rules 2179 and 2180 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2179, 2180) provide venue and service requirements for suits against a
corporation. Rule 2180 is not a "long-arm" provision except to the extent that the sheriff
is unable to make service, in which case service is authorized through the Secretary of
the Commonwealth. If service is made under Rule 2180 the test for whether or not a
corporation was "doing business" will be the same as the applied for Section 2011C
of the Business Corporation Law. Botwinick v. Credit Exchange,. Inc., 419 Pa. 65, 213
A.2d 349 (1965). However, service may not be proper under Rule 2180 though a corpora-
tion is "doing business" under Subsection C of Section 2011. If the corporation has no
agent in the state service must be made pursuant to Subsection B of Section 2011. Myers
v. Mooney Aircraft, 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967).
42. 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 (1927).
43. Id. at 246-47, 135 A. at 757. It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in 1927 felt that it was able to exercise jurisdiction over unregistered corporations
to the extent of due process. The writers of this note find this somewhat ironic in view
of the current state of Pennsylvania "long-arm" jurisdiction.
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test was known as the "solicitation plus" doctrine and obviously ren-
dered it difficult to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations.44
1951-A "Long-Arm" Enacted (Subsections B and C)
In 1951 Subsections B and C of Section 2011 of the Business Corpo-
ration Law were added. These subsections are the substance of Penn-
sylvania jurisdiction over unregistered corporations. In their present
form they provide as follows:
B. Any foreign business corporation which shall have done any
business in this Commonwealth, without procuring a certificate
of authority to do so from the Department of State, shall be con-
clusively presumed to have designated the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept,
on its behalf, service of process in any action arising within this
Commonwealth.
C. For the purposes of determining jurisdiction of courts within
this Commonwealth, the doing by any corporation in this Com-
monwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object,
or doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose, with
the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts, shall con-
stitute "doing business." For the purposes of this subsection the
shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through
this Commonwealth shall be considered the doing of such an act
in this Commonwealth.
In Rufo v. Bastian Blessing Company,45 these provisions were held
to have been enacted for the purpose of abolishing the "solicitation
plus" doctrine and increasing foreign corporations' amenability to
suit within the state. However, Rufo also forecast a certain amount of
gloom for Pennsylvania plaintiffs. Subsection B as it then existed 46 was
held to embody two jurisdictional requirements: (1) the corporation
must have done business within the meaning of Subsection C, and (2)
the cause of action must arise out of acts or omissions of the corpora-
tion within the Commonwealth. 47 Thus, while the defendant in Rufo
was found to have been doing business within the state for purposes
of Subsection C, the negligent act did not occur within the state
44. See generally, Developments-Jurisdiction at 919-923.
45. 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
46. Before the 1963 amendment Subsection B provided for long-arm jurisdiction in
.. any action arising out of acts or omissions of such corporation within this Common-
wealth."
47. 405 Pa. at 22, 173 A.2d at 128.
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thereby failing without Subsection B. Hence jurisdiction could not be
assumed. The court recognized that due process would not have been
offended by the assertion of jurisdiction, but felt that the jurisdictional
requirements of Subsection B were clear on their face. 48
The requirement that a foreign corporation be "doing business"
within the state has resulted in the denial of jurisdiction in many cases
where due process would unquestionably have allowed its assertion.
Primarily responsible have been the restrictive features of the statute.
However, unlike courts in other jurisdictions,4a the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has been unwilling, without legislative direction, to
adopt a liberal interpretation of "doing business" to reflect the in-
creased scope of jurisdiction initiated by International Shoe.
Until the 1968 amendments, the statutory language of Subsection C
required an "entry" 50 by the foreign corporation into the state. In
Swavley v. Vandergrift51 a Pennsylvania resident had suffered property
damage when a fire destroyed his home. The fire was caused by an al-
legedly defective incinerator manufactured by a foreign corporation.
In a suit against the retailer, the retailer attempted to join the non-
resident manufacturer who had no officers or property in Pennsyl-
vania. Defendant manufacturer marketed its incinerators on a nation-
wide basis through independent wholesalers. Orders were accepted at
defendant's home office and sold outright to distributors. Advertising
expenses were shared with distributors who were required to submit
monthly reports of sales and inventories and were forbidden to sell
similar products. Additionally, there were two "manufacturers repre-
48. Prior to this decision the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had interpreted
Subsection B's language of "arising out of acts or omissions within this Commonwealth"
as including situations as in Rufo where the negligent act occurred outside the state and
the injury occurred within it. Florio v. Powder Power Tool Co., 248 F.2d 367 (1957). The
court in Rufo expressly rejected this interpretation.
49. See, e.g., Northern Supply, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 397 P.2d 1013 (Alas. 1965)
where the Alaska Supreme Court construed the statutory language of "transacting busi-
ness" as "encompassing all those activities which would subject a foreign corporation to
the jurisdiction of our courts when measured by the outer limits of the federal constitu-
tion." Of course, it is recognized that the language of Subsection C would not permit as
broad a construction as that made by the Alaska court. But it is believed that liberalizing
the concept of "doing business" would have permitted jurisdiction in a substantially larger
number of cases. See also, Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonregistered Corporations Doing
Business in Pennsylvania: Confusion in Perspective, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 879 (1966).
50. Subsection C previously provided:
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction of courts within this Commonwealth, the
entry of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the doing of a series of similar
acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing
art object, or doing a single act in this Commonwealth with the intention of thereby
initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute "doing business." [Emphasis added.]
51. 397 Pa. 281, 154 A.2d 779 (1959).
330
Vol. 8: 319, 1970
Comments
sentatives" whose Pennsylvania functions included seeking new dis-
tributorships as well as overseeing those already in existence. The
court, in holding that both men were independent parties not subject
to the requisite degree of control by the foreign manufacturer neces-
sary to render it amenable to suit within the Commonwealth, stated:
Obviously an impersonal corporate entity organized and located
in another jurisdiction can be said in the words of the statute, to
have "entered" the state of Pennsylvania only if its agents or prop-
erty have been physically present therein .... *2 (Emphasis
added.)
There can be little doubt that defendant's Pennsylvania activities were
more than sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" test of Inter-
national Shoe.
Thus, until the 1963 amendments not only did the negligent act
or omission have to occur within the state for purposes of Subsection
B, but Subsection C could not be satisfied if the foreign corporation,
desirous of a Pennsylvania market, but unwilling to establish offices
there, were careful in setting up its distributorship so as to avoid its
being labeled the corporation's agent rather than an independent con-
tractor.
1963-Subsections B and C Amended
In the 1963 amendments of Subsections B and C the legislature
deleted from Subsection B the phrase "out of acts or omissions of such
corporation." 53 Subsection C was changed from "For the purposes of
this section" to "For the purpose of determining jurisdiction of courts
within this Commonwealth." The legislature retained the definition
of "doing business" in Subsection C.
Under the 1963 amendments the question was raised as to whether
they eliminated the requirement that the situs of the injury be within
the state. The district courts went both ways. 54 The issue was first
raised, but unanswered, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Miller
v. Kiamesha-Concord Inc.55 The court finally decided, without dis-
cussion, in Myers v. Mooney Aircraft 6 that the "statutory requisite
52. Id.
53. See note 50, supra.
54. Compare: Electrosonics International Inc. v. Wurlitzer Co., 234 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa.
1964) with Spry v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 234 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
55. 420 Pa. 604, 218 A.2d 309 (1966).
56. 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967).
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that the action must arise out of 'acts or omissions' in Pennsylvania
is eliminated and the sole question is whether . . . [the corporation]
was 'doing business' in the Commonwealth." 57
Thus, under the 1963 amendments it was possible to secure juris-
diction over a nonresident corporation for (1) a negligent act occurring
outside the state, and (2) a cause of action unrelated to the corpora-
tion's Pennsylvania activities. However, the "doing business" provi-
sions of the 1951 act remained unchanged. With an unwillingness to
expand on its own the definition of "doing business," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, and consequently the federal courts5s sitting in Penn-
sylvania, continued to deny jurisdiction in many cases where the as-
sertion would have undoubtedly comported with due process.
In Miller v. Kiamesha-Concord, Inc.,59 two Pennsylvania residents
were injured at defendant's New York hotel. Defendant had no prop-
erty and paid no rent in Pennsylvania. However, a Pennsylvania
representative had solicited a substantial amount of business in the
state borne out by the fact that she was paid commissions on more
than $200,000 worth of business per year. Defendant supplied her with
all necessary forms and materials. Its name was listed in the telephone
directory though the service charges were paid by the Pennsylvania
representative. The court held that the New York hotel was not "doing
business" in this state for the Pennsylvania representative was an in-
dependent contractor whose activities were not subject to the hotel's
control.
60
57. Id. at 184, 240 A.2d at 510. At no point in the opinion did the court speak of the
constitutionality of its assertion of jurisdiction. It seems dear in Myers that defendant's
activities in the state were a sufficient basis for jurisdiction though the cause of action was
unrelated to its Pennsylvania activities. However, this will not always be true. See text at
note 14 et. seq., supra.
58. It has been pointed out that the Federal Courts sitting in Pennsylvania have taken
a more liberal approach in determining whether an unregistered corporation has done
business within the state than has the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Note, Jurisdiction
Over Nonregistered Corporations Doing Business in Pennsylvania: Confusion in Perspective,
27 U. PIrr. L. REv. 879 (1966). However, the federal courts have also denied jurisdiction
in many cases where due process would have allowed its assertion. Meench v. Raymond
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (manufacturer who sold and advertised on a nation-
wide basis held to have entered the Pennsylvania market through an independent con-
tractor); Smeltzer v. Deere & Co., 252 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (parent corporation
distributed products through wholly-owned subsidiary); Rachelson v. E.I. duPont de-
Nemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (Pennsylvania dealer the exclusive outlet
for unregistered corporation).
59. 420 Pa. 604, 218 A.2d 309 (1966).
60. Accord, Yoffe v. Golin, 413 Pa. 154, 196 A.2d 317 (1964); Narnie v. DiGirolamo, 412
Pa. 589, 195 A.2d 517 (1963). It is interesting to note that in Miller had the Pennsylvania
representative wished to sue the hotel for commissions due her, a Pennsylvania forum
would have been unavailable though the contract may well have been entered into in
Pennsylvania and was to be performed here.
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Other cases involved factual situations similar to that in Swavley, 6'
and the test for "doing business" continued to be applied rigidly.
The courts remained troubled by the language of Subsection C re-
quiring an "entry" by the corporation into the state. Thus, even where
a foreign corporation had carried on substantial business in the state
by the sale of its machines both directly and through jobbers the juris-
dictional requirements were not met where the corporation had not
"entered" the state either by physical presence or through agents. 62
Only where the corporation's contacts were very heavy has jurisdiction
been asserted under Subsection C. Thus jurisdiction was allowed when
the corporation's salaried employees made monthly visits to the state
and where a "close collaboration" existed between the corporation and
its distributors.6 3
1968-"Doing Business" within Subsection C Redefined
The 1968 amendments appear to change a large body of existing
case law. The requirement of Subsection C that the corporation
"enter" the state has been abolished and thus the entire Swavley line
of cases64 where unregistered corporations marketed their goods in
Pennsylvania through independent retailers and those cases such as
Miller v. Kiamesha-Concord, Inc.,65 where representatives found to be
"independent contractors" had substantial Pennsylvania contacts and
were directly furthering the business of an unregistered corporation
should fall. However, the first appellate court to interpret Subsection
C as amended seems to have taken a contrary view. 66 It reasoned that
the requirement of "entry" by a foreign corporation has long been
dismissed as a necessary element of due process. While the court was
certainly correct as to the matter of due process, it unfortunately
overlooked the long line of cases interpreting Subsection C as re-
61. Cecere v. Ohrninger Home Furniture, 208 Pa. Super. 138, 220 A.2d 350 (1966).
See also note 58 and cases cited therein.
62. Henderson v. N.Y. Pressing Machinery Corp., 241 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
63. Frish v. Alexson Equipment Corp., 423 Pa. 247, 224 A.2d 183 (1966). See also
Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, 429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967), where the unregistered cor-
poration was found to be "doing business" though it had no agents within the state and
distributed its products through an independent contractor.
64. See notes 58, 61 and 62, supra.
65. See notes 59 and 60, supra.
66. Nettis v. DiLido Hotel, 215 Pa. Super. 284, 296, 257 A.2d 643, 649 (1969). There the
Superior Court in discussing the opinion of the lower court stated:
The court reasoned that the word "entry" had been eliminated from this amendment,
and that the elimination of the word which had appeared in that section prior to the
1968 amendment made a difference in cases decided in Pennsylvania before and after
the amendment. We do not agree with this reasoning.
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quiring the corporation's "entry" into the state by its actual physical
presence.67 If the court's interpretation of the amendment is that it
fails to command the reversal of these cases it must surely be overruled
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This, it is believed, would be
entirely proper for the cases fall well within the demands of due
process and the inconvenience to Pennsylvania residents forced to sue
in a foreign court is readily apparent. The 1968 amendments were
enacted in apparent response to this situation and to apply the same
standard of "entered" to Subsection C would be to ignore a clear legis-
lative mandate.
It must be emphasized that the legislature has not succeeded in
bridging the "due process gap" through the 1968 amendments. Re-
tained in Subsection C is the language requiring "the doing of a series
of similar acts . . . or doing a single act . . . with the intention of
thereby initiating a series of such acts." Based on this language, the
Pennsylvania plaintiff in Tudesco v. Publishers Company8 was unable
to secure jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that had come into
the state and entered into a contract with him apparently to be per-
formed at least in part in Pennsylvania. The decision must stand based
upon Subsection C in its present form though once again due process
would allow,69 and fairness would seem to require, the assertion of
jurisdiction. Beyond the facts in Tudesco, it is not difficult to envision
situations where the denial of jurisdiction would lead to an even more
inequitable result. Suppose an Ohio contracting firm agrees to build a
new house for a Pennsylvania resident. It is negligent in construction
and one week after work is completed the roof begins to leak. Con-
struction of the house was the only Pennsylvania activity of the Ohio
corporation and it had no intention of any further Pennsylvania con-
tacts. It seems clear that Subsection C would prohibit the Pennsylvania
homeowner from maintaining suit in a Pennsylvania forum, though
due process would not be offended,70 and a Pennsylvania forum would
certainly be the most appropriate. In such business settings where
defehdants' activities within the state are designed to secure an eco-
67. See notes 58 through 62, supra.
68. 232 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 246
F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1965) where this section of the statute was construed as contemplat-
ing a "systematic course of conduct rather than isolated or sporadic occurrences."
69. WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958).
70. See note 18, supra, discussing the constitutionality of "single tort" statutes. Of
course, by requiring a "series of acts" Subsection C fails to reach the single tort situation.
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nomic benefit there simply is no reason to deny jurisdiction to an
injured or disappointed Pennsylvania plaintiff.
Of even greater significance is the last sentence of Subsection C,
added by the 1968 amendments, which provides:
For the purposes of this subsection the shipping of merchandise
directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth shall
be considered the doing of such an act in this Commonwealth.
The legislature, as it has done by deleting the word "entry" from the
first sentence, is providing Pennsylvania courts with a significantly
broader standard for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident corpora-
tions. However a question of interpretation is presented. The first sen-
tence of Subsection C provides for jurisdiction for the doing of a
single act only when it is done "with the intention of thereby in-
itiating a series of similar acts." Yet the new sentence equates the
"shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly" into the state with
the "doing of such an act" within the preceding sentence. The new
sentence appears on its face to indicate that a single shipment of mer-
chandise into the state will constitute "doing business." This, in effect,
would make Subsection C a "single act" statute for the shipment of
goods into the state. If this interpretation is adopted, the section
might be unconstitutional applied to the following facts: A Pennsyl-
vania resident on vacation in California notices a small advertisement
for potted plants in a local California newsweekly. The California
plant distributor sells only to a limited local market. The Pennsylvania
resident returns home with the newsweekly and orders one of de-
fendant's potted plants. Upon opening the package containing the
plant, the Pennsylvania plaintiff is bitten by a blackwidow spider.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in failing to inspect
the potted plant before shipment and brings suit in Pennsylvania. It
seems clear that defendant's connections with Pennsylvania would be
insufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" test of International
Shoe.7 1 Yet the statute would purport to give jurisdiction in just such
a case.
Moreover, it will be recalled that in Myers v. Mooney Aircraft72 it
was held that Subsections B and C would allow jurisdiction where the
71. See Judge Sobeloff's famous discussion in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) of the California dealer who sells a set of tires to a
Pennsylvania tourist who is injured in Pennsylvania.
72. See text at note 56, supra.
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cause of action is unrelated to the corporation's Pennsylvania activities.
The sole inquiry is whether or not the corporation is "doing business"
within the state. Thus, if Subsection C equates a single shipment of
merchandise with "doing business," it would follow that a suit could
be maintained on a cause of action unrelated to the shipment. How-
ever, International Shoe made it perfectly clear that due process would
not permit jurisdiction in such a case.
73
This is not to suggest that Subsection C should not be read as a
"single act" statute. Given a manufacturer who contracts to send his
product to a Pennsylvania resident, it does not seem unfair to make
him responsible in a Pennsylvania forum for any injuries which result
from the negligent design of the product.74 Additionally, jurisdiction
could be asserted over the manufacturer who distributes his goods on
a nationwide basis and, through a "single shipment" into the state,
merely places his product into the stream of commerce.75 Finally, the
statute, so interpreted, would allow jurisdiction consistent with due
process over the manufacturer of a component part who, in the truest
sense of the word, ships his product "indirectly" into the state if he
derives substantial revenue from the sale.
76
However, if the new sentence of Subsection C is read as providing
for jurisdiction over a single shipment only when done with the in-
tention of initiating further similar shipments, Pennsylvania residents
will often be denied a convenient forum to litigate. It is submitted
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should read Subsection C as a
"single act" statute for the shipment of goods limited only by the
demands of the Due Process Clause.
Subsection D-Specific Exclusions to "Doing Business"
D. For the purposes of determining jurisdiction of courts within
this Commonwealth, inspecting, appraising and acquiring real
estate and mortgages, and other liens thereon, and personal prop.-
73. See text at note 4, supra.
74. Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961).
75. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1176 (1966).
76. Johnson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 22 App. Div. 2d 138, 254
N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dept. 1964).
Now that the "entry" requirement has been abolished and the shipment of goods into
the state, directly or indirectly, constitutes "doing business," there should be no difficulty,
either statutorily or constitutionally, asserting jurisdiction over the manufacturer whose
products regularly enter the state whether by direct shipment or indirectly through the
chain of distribution.
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erty and security interests therein, and holding, leasing away,
conveying and transferring the same, as fiduciary or otherwise, or
collecting debts and enforcing mortgages and rights in property
securing the same by any foreign business corporation shall not
constitute "doing business."
As a postscript to Section 2011, the legislature in 196677 added the
loosely worded Subsection D which specifically excludes certain ac-
tivities from the definition of "doing business." Subsection D has never
been interpreted by a Pennsylvania court. Moreover, the writers of
this note have been unable to find a similar provision in any other
long-arm statute. The following hypotheticals illustrate the harsh
results which Subsection D would command.
(1) Defendant is a New York Corporation specializing in inventory
financing. It enters the state to act on certain secured debts of plain-
tiff, a local businessman. The claim is settled, but due to defendant's
negligence, plaintiff is listed as a credit risk with the local credit
agency. Plaintiff's business is seriously and directly injured. Plaintiff's
relief must be found in a New York court.
(2) Defendant, a Washington, D.C. bank, sends an agent to Penn-
sylvania to contact plaintiff, an appliance dealer. After negotiation,
the parties contract for defendant to finance plaintiff's inventory. Sub-
sequently, defendant breaches the contract and plaintiff is forced to
secure a new financing arrangement at a substantially higher interest
rate. Again, plaintiff would be unable to maintain suit in a Penn-
sylvania court.
It is indeed difficult to conceive of the policy considerations em-
bodied in Subsection D which would support these results.
7 8
77. Subsection D was also amended in 1968 but its substantive provisions remain
unchanged.
78. Apparently the Pennsylvania Bar Association Corporation Law Committee felt that
Subsection D would encourage investors to make loans to Pennsylvania residents. 2 SELL,
PENNSYLVANIA BusINEss CO'ORATIONS § 1011.12. However, one must wonder to what extent,
if at all, immunity from suit is a real factor in a foreign investment company's decision
to enter the Pennsylvania market, especially in light of the fact that they are given no
such sancity in other states. Even assuming that it is a factor, it is believed that Subsection
D is probably an unnecessary inducement in terms of the availability of loans, and may
well result in substantial hardship to Pennsylvania residents deprived of a convenient
forum. Moreover, Subsection D seems to cover situations beyond a foreign corporation's
entering the state merely to make a loan. For instance, a corporation which comes to
Pennsylvania to purchase real estate or collect debts secured by property is apparently
immune from suit within the commonwealth.
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ACCIDENTS INVOLVING REAL ESTATE-SECTION 331
Pennsylvania's other major long-arm statute, enacted in 1937, is
entitled "Actions Against Non-residents Which Involve Real Estate."
79
Section 331 provides:
[A]ny nonresident . . . being the owner, tenant, or user, of real
estate . . . within the Commonwealth . . . shall . . . make and
constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth . . . his ... agent
for the service of process in any civil action or proceedings insti-
tuted ... against such owner, tenant, or user ... arising out of or
by reason of any accident or injury occurring within the Com-
monwealth in which such real estate, footways, and curbs are in-
volved.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has dealt with this section on four
occasions. The earliest case of consequence, Murphy v. Indovina,80
merely provides that the nonresident defendant must be an "owner,
tenant or user" at the time the cause of action occurred.
81
Betcher v. Hay-Roe (When Is Realty "Involved"?)
A 1968 case, Betcher v. Hay-Roe,82 provides more insight into the
statute and the tests to be applied in determining whether or not Sec-
tion 331 should be applied to a particular defendant. There plaintiff
was babysitting for defendants in their rented house when her chair
collapsed. When the suit was commenced defendants had given up
their lease and moved to Hawaii. Defendants' preliminary objections
to service under Section 331 were overruled by the lower court. In:
affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice O'Brien, rejected defendants' contention that since the chair
was personalty the terms of the statute had not been met because the
real estate was not at least casually connected with the accident. The
court said the issue was whether real estate was "involved."83 In de-
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1937), which is provided in its entirety in the Appen-
dix.
80. 384 Pa. 26, 119 A.2d 258 (1956). In Gearhart v. Pulakos, 207 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.
Pa. 1962) it was held in a sidewalk fall case that defendants, who owned the property at
the time the cause of action accrued but not when the suit was instituted, could be
served under Section 331.
81. Rumig v. Ripley Mfg. Corp., 366 Pa. 343, 77 A.2d 360 (1951) held that a New
York parent corporation could be served under this section as an "owner, tenant, or user"
or realty located in Pennsylvania which was held by its wholly-owned subsidiary, a Penn-
sylvania corporation.
82. 429 Pa. 371, 240 A.2d 501 (1968) reviewed in 7 Duq. L. REv. 138 (1968).
83. Id. at 374, 240 A.2d at 503.
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ciding that it was, two prior Common Pleas Court decisions, Andrews
v. Jaffa 4 and Shouse v. Wagner,5 which required the casual connec-
tion, were rejected, the court stating that "[w]e cannot agree" that
involvement under Section 331 "requires more than the occurrence of
the accident or injury on the real estate." 6
In Andrews, plaintiff suffered a gunshot wound which was inflicted
by the minor defendant on a farm owned by the minor defendant's
father, who was also named defendant. While the farm was located
in the state, defendants resided in Ohio. In holding there was no
statutory authority for in personam jurisdiction the court stated:
[t]he accident did not arise out of or occur by reason of any acci-
dent or injury within this commonwealth in which real estate,
footways and curbs were involved. According to the complaint,
the accident did occur on the defendants' property but the prop-
erty itself was not involved.8 7
In Shouse, plaintiff stored his car overnight in defendant's leased
parking garage from which it was stolen. Suit was initiated following
recovery of the car in a damaged condition, but not before defendant
gave up his lease and moved to Florida. In holding the service under
Section 331 invalid the court said, "[b]eing 'involved' is not the same
as being the site of location of an accident."88 The court added that
the realty's condition should be "casually connected" with the in-
jury.89
In Betcher v. Hay-Roe the court rejected the requirement of a casual
relationship as being necessary for involvement and stated that it is
only necessary that the accident or injury occur on the real estate. The
court said its result was "consonant with justice" arguing:
Where an accident involving a Pennsylvania resident occurs in
the Pennsylvania home of other Pennsylvania residents, and the
victim is treated by Pennsylvania doctors in Pennsylvania, then
surely it is unjust to require the plaintiff to go to Hawaii to sue.
And it would be wrong to attribute any such unjust motive to the
legislature.90 [Emphasis added.]
The court's rationale is subject to criticism since its enumeration of
84. 3 Crawford Co. L.J. 192 (1963).
85. 84 Pa. D. & C. 82 (1952).
86. 429 Pa. at 375, 240 A.2d at 503.
87. 3 Crawford Co. L.J. 192, 196 (1963).
88. 84 Pa. D. & C. 82, 84 (1952).
89. Id. at 85.
90. 429 Pa. at 377, 240 A.2d at 505.
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the Pennsylvania contacts do little to explain why the realty was "in-
volved" within the meaning of Section 331. These contacts may be
good reasons why Pennsylvania should exercise jurisdiction and surely
are far in excess of the "minimum contacts" required by International
Shoe, but what do they tell of the legislature's intent when it required
that the realty be "involved"?
Messick v. Gordon (Who Is a User?)
Shortly after Betcher was decided, the court again faced the lan-
guage of Section 331. Messick v. Gordon9' arose when defendant, an
overnight patron in plaintiff's motel, allegedly caused a fire which re-
sulted in extensive damage. Defendant's preliminary objections were
sustained by the lower court which stated that defendant's occupancy
of the room did not constitute a "use" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 331. Again speaking through Mr. Justice O'Brien, the court af-
firmed saying that if defendant were a "user ' 92 then in every accident
occurring in Pennsylvania defendant would "be a user of real estate."93
The court added that since Section 331 was enacted prior to Interna-
tional Shoe, it had to be interpreted as having been intended by the
legislature to be constitutional according to the limited earlier stan-
dards.94 The court felt its view was consistent with the lower court
decisions of Dubin v. City of Philadelphia95 and Bates v. Kelly96 which
were decided shortly after the act was passed and required a user to
have a "substantial connection" with the realty.
In Dubin, plaintiff brought suit following a fall on a broken side-
walk. Defendant, a New Jersey mortgagee of the property, was leasing
it to another because the mortgagor had defaulted. Defendant had
never been in physical possession of the property. In holding that de-
fendant was a "user" within the meaning of Section 331, Judge Bok
said;
91, 434 Pa. 30, 252 A.2d 627 (1969).
92. The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Roberts with Chief Justice Bell concurring,
argued that defendant was both a "tenant" and "user," and if not the former then surely
the latter. It was argued that "use" was the right to "hold or occupy and have the fruits
thereof" and that defendant dearly had the "use" of the motel room. 434 Pa. at 36, 252
A.2d at 630.
93. 434 Pa. at 34, 252 A.2d at 630.
94. The court noted that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552(3) sets up the presumption that
the legislature did not intend to violate the constitution; that Section 331 was passed in
1937, eight years before International Shoe was handed down by the Supreme Court. See
the discussion at note 101, infra.
95. 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).
96. 32 Pa. D. & C. 2d 444 (1963).
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While [defendant's] use is not based on possessio pedis, it is shown
by her collecting rents, by her using them to pay city taxes and
water rents, and by her leasing the property to the present tenants.
This . ..is an active exercise of the "right to possession" which
inured in her when the mortgage was executed.97
The plaintiff in Bates, a Boy Scout, slipped and fell into a gorge
while under the supervision of defendant, a Scoutmaster who later
became a resident of New York State. The occupancy of the land was
with permission of the owner, who was not a party to the action. In
sustaining defendant's preliminary objections to service under Sec-
tion 331, the court said that "mere presence on the property, without
more, is not such a use as authorizes service."98
Discussion-Betcher and Messick
Taking Betcher and Messick together it would appear that the Su-
preme Court has adopted a test by which the court should be ex-
tremely liberal in determining whether an accident or injury arises
out of circumstances in which real estate is "involved." No casual con-
nection between the realty and the injury will be required. On the
other hand, the court is quite restrictive when the question is whether
defendant is an "owner, tenant, or user" of real estate. Indications are
that Mr. Justice O'Brien was of the opinion that a broad test in both
instances would allow in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant whenever an accident occurred here. This, he feels, would
violate due process.99
It is submitted that the liberal reading in Betcher was based upon
a realization of the problem that Pennsylvania faces with its limited
long-arm statutes.10 0 Of course, the court, given a limited statute such
as Section 331, incapable of a broad interpretation, was forced to cur-
tail its application at some point. Messick was that point. This being
so, it is possible that had Messick been decided before Betcher instead
97. 34 Pa. D. & C. at 70.
98. 32 Pa. D. & C.2d at 446.
99. See 434 Pa. at 34, 252 A.2d at 630, where the court states that "even current
standards of due process" may be violated when in personam jurisdiction is permitted
whenever an accident occurs in Pennsylvania. But see discussion in the text at footnotes
117 and 118, infra.
100. This statement is made with full awareness of the general rule of construction
that nonresident service statutes, because they are in derogation of the common law, are
to be strictly construed. Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa. 570, 192 A. 924 (1937); McCall
v. Gates, 354 Pa. 158, 47 A.2d 211 (1946). However, it is strongly believed that in both
Betcher and Messick the court wanted very much to permit service which would be as
broad as possible under the statute.
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of after it, the "involved" test could well be strict today requiring a
casual relationship, and the "owner, tenant, or user" test could be
broad, perhaps applying to even licensees or trespassers. This construc-
tion of Section 331 without reference to its date of enactment would
be just as logical since the word "user" is capable of broader construc-
tion and would have provided just results in cases such as Messick
or Andrews.
The current tests, on the other hand, are consistent with the court's
stated purpose of interpreting the 1937 statute in light of the due
process standards which existed prior to International Shoe. Even then
a cause of action which was related to continuous activity within the
state permitted the assertion of jurisdiction.' 0 ' The strict interpreta-
tion of the "user" test insures defendant's continuous activity while
the real estate does not have to be "involved" for the activity to be
related to the cause of action. Thus, whenever the accident or injury
occurs on defendant's realty the cause of action would be related to
continuous activity within the state and would satisfy the pre-Inter-
national Shoe tests for due process.
Nevertheless, the court in its interpretation of Section 331 felt that
it was on the horns of a serious dilemma: a narrow interpretation of
either requirement of Section 331 will result in some manifest in-
justices, but a broad interpretation of both may well, in the court's
opinion, render the statute in violation of the Due Process Clause.
0 2
"Accident or Injury"
Another limitation of Section 331 revolves about the requirement
of an "accident or injury."'0 3 Whether this phrase would include an
injury due to a breach of contract has not been decided by any appel-
late Pennsylvania court. In Shouse, however, it was held that the
phrase does not include contract actions. The court noted that "injury
may result also from the failure to perform a duty imposed by a con-
tract, but an injury involving a breach of contract is not provided for
in the act.' 0 4 It is doubtful whether any court would apply Section
331 more broadly and allow in personam jurisdiction based upon
causes of action sounding in assumpsit.
101. This is the factual pattern of "continuous activity, action related" discussed in
the text at footnotes 12 and 13 supra.
102. Under certain circumstances this could occur. See text at notes 117 and 118 infra.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331, quoted in the Appendix, provides that "any civil
action . . . arising out of or by reason of any accident or injury."
104. 84 Pa. D. & C. at 84.
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Due Process and Section 331
The Pennsylvania real estate statute was first declared constitutional
in Dubin v. City of Philadelphia where Judge Bok, relying upon Hess
v. Pawloski'05 and similar nonresident motorists cases decided in Penn-
sylvania, found that "the legal philosophy which supports the one
should also support the other."' 0 6 His analysis centered upon the state's
interest in the condition of real estate located within the Common-
weal th.
In Betcher the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute
as applied did not violate due process. It quoted the passage from In-
ternational Shoe reproduced in the text, supra at note 9, and said that
the "mere stating of the factual posture of the case shows that notions
of fair play and justice are not violated" by the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction.107
In Messick, the dissent failed to mention due process. Their vote to
reverse, however, was an indication that due process would have been
satisfied in their opinion by the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-
resident motel patron. 08 The majority, on the other hand, failed to
indicate where it felt the particular fact situation fell, but did state
that if defendant were a user then it would be "difficult to conceive
of an accident occurring in Pennsylvania in which the defendant
would not be a user of real estate."' 0 9 The court added that the legisla-
ture did not intend to permit in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident "whenever an accident occurs here" and that there is "doubt
that even current standards of due process" would permit such a broad
exercise of jurisdiction."10
Since International Shoe, however, other state legislatures have in-
tended to exercise in personam jurisdiction whenever an accident oc-
curred within their state arising out of defendant's activities there, and
state courts have upheld the statutes as constitutional in situations
involving no continuous activity by defendant within the state.," Illi-
nois, for example, provides for in personam jurisdiction over nonresi-
105. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). There a long-arm motorists statute was held constitutional.
106. 34 Pa. D. & C. at 64.
107. 429 Pa. at 377, 240 A.2d at 505.
108. This is because, as explained in the text at note 4, supra, in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident requires both a sufficiently broad statute and the "minimum contacts"
necessary for due process.
109. 434 Pa. at 34, 252 A.2d at 630.
110. id.
111. See the discussion in note 18, supra.
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dents following "The commission of a tortious act within the state.""12
In Nelson v. Miller,11 3 service under the statute was upheld where de-
fendant, an out-of-state appliance dealer, sent his agent into Illinois
to deliver a stove. While plaintiff was assisting with the unloading,
the appliance fell due to the agent's negligence causing plaintiff's in-
jury. In such "single-tort" cases no connections with the real estate
are shown and the realty is not "involved" in the tort in any meaning-
ful sense.
Beyond the single-tort situations, the cases indicate that the owner,
tenant, or user of real estate who is a nonresident can be served within
the bounds of due process when realty is involved. Illinois, for ex-
ample, allows service based upon "any cause of action arising from...
The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate" located within the
state.114 This was upheld in Porter v. Nahas'15 where an Illinois apart-
ment owner sued a former tenant on a cause of action arising from
the use of the apartment in violation of the terms of the lease. In
Bowsher v. Digby,"16 which arose under a similar statute, an Arkansas
realtor sued on a listing contract made with the nonresident owner of
Arkansas realty. The court held the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion constitutional.
Thus, other states with sufficiently broad long-arm statutes have held
constitutional in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents whenever
(1) any tort arose out of defendant's activities within the state or (2)
any cause of action arose from the ownership, use or possession of real
estate within the state.
Applying the modern tests for due process to the Pennsylvania cases
which have arisen under Section 331, it is apparent that the state's
exercise of jurisdiction in every case (except perhaps Murphy and only
because the ownership was before the cause of action complained of)
would have come well within the "minimum contacts" required by
International Shoe. In Messick the motel patron entered the state and
contracted for the room thus availing himself of the protections and
benefits of the Pennsylvania laws. The tort arose out of his use of the
motel room. In Andrews the minor defendant's negligence occurred
in the Commonwealth on land owned by the other defendant. They
112. ILL. REv. STAT. C. 110 § 17(l)(b) (1963).
113. 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
114. ILL. Rxv. STAT. c. 110 § 17(I)(c) (1963).
115. 35 IlL. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (Ist Dist. 1962).
116. 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).
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benefited from the state laws and entered the state to conduct the ac-
tivities complained of. The defendant in Shouse leased a building in
the state and operated a business within the Commonwealth where the
contract sued upon was executed and was to be performed. The Boy
Scout in Bates as well as the defendant were residents of Pennsylvania
where their relationship arose and the negligence occurred.
In addition, the application of the narrowly-drafted Pennsylvania
statute to fact situations which have arisen in other states where juris-
diction was exercised would lead to an opposite result. In Nelson v.
Miller, for example, Section 331 would suffice to the extent that real
property was "involved" and the cause of action arose out of an "acci-
dent or injury." Defendant, however, was not a "user" of the real
estate. Porter v. Nahas and Bowsher v. Digby, clearly involving an
"owner, tenant, or user" of real estate which was "involved," would
fall without Section 331 for they arose on causes of action sounding
in assumpsit.
Thus, it would seem apparent that the Pennsylvania plaintiff is
denied the use of his own forum when plaintiffs of other states, given
an identical cause of action, would not be. This denial is in no way
required by the Due Process Clause. Even on what could be consid-
ered a small claim, such as in Shouse, the injured Pennsylvania plain-
tiff may be forced to travel across the country, hire out-of-state counsel,
and transport witnesses. This, it is submitted, is such inconvenience
that many small claims are never prosecuted. Larger claims, on the
other hand, may be so costly that the plaintiff who does recover is
not made whole.
It is also submitted that Justice O'Brien's assertion that doubt exists
as to the constitutionality of exercising in personam jurisdiction
"whenever an accident occurs here" is only partially correct. Clearly,
due process would support the assertion of jurisdiction if the negli-
gent act occurs within the state.117 The only area of doubt that exists
under the current tests for due process is where the negligent act
occurs outside the state, but the accident or injury occurs within."18
HARDSHIP BEYOND MERE INCONVENIENCE
The inconvenience to a Pennsylvania plaintiff who is forced to sue
in Florida, California or even New York is manifest. But the un-
117. See text at note 18 and note 18 supra.
118. See the discussion of "foreign act, local injury" in text at note 25 supra.
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availability of a Pennsylvania forum may work an even more substan-
tial hardship. It may well deny the plaintiff substantive justice.
Mickley v. Kessel (Legislative Intent Frustrated)
The possibility of such a denial of substantive justice is well dem-
onstrated by the 1963 Common Pleas Court case of Mickley v. Kes-
sel.119 There defendants, residents of West Virginia, entered plaintiff's
land in Adams County and unlawfully cut and carried away timber
valued at over $2,600. Ruling on defendants' preliminary objections
to service under Section 331, the court held that defendants were
neither an owner, tenant nor user of the real estate which, in addition,
was not "involved." While the court's decision that the land was not
"involved" may well be incorrect in light of Betcher, the holding of
Messick would dictate that the same result as to defendant's "use" be
reached. Thus, plaintiff could not sue in Pennsylvania for a tort com-
mitted here.
In this case, as in many of the other Pennsylvania cases, there would
not appear to be any difficulty in finding that service under a suffi-
ciently broad statute would meet the requirements of due process. De-
fendant allegedly entered the state and committed a serious tort
directly related to the land and one which has important economic
consequences; important enough that the Pennsylvania Penal Code
provides for the recovery of treble damages following such a conver-
sion.120 Yet plaintiff was unable to sue in Pennsylvania. The impor-
tance of this fact lies in the thought that plaintiff, in pursuing his
remedy in West Virginia, may well lose the benefit of treble damages
which the legislature intended to afford him. This result could accrue
because the West Virginia court could well consider the Pennsylvania
statute penal and therefore hold that it is not entitled to enforcement
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.1
21
The plight of the plaintiff in Mickley v. Kessel is far from unique
since it could occur in innumerable other ways. Furthermore, the laws
of a foreign jurisdiction may preclude the Pennsylvania plaintiff from
ever maintaining suit. For example, a recent Pennsylvania enactment
provides for a twelve year statute of limitations in actions involving,
among other things, injuries arising out of the construction of an im-
119. 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 529 (1963).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4935 (1939).
121. H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 18 (4th ed. 164).
346
Vol. 8: 319, 1970
Comments
provement to real property.122 West Virginia's statute of limitations
for such an action is two years. 123 If in personam jurisdiction could not
be gained over a West Virginia defendant under a Pennsylvania long-
arm and suit were commenced in West Virginia more than two years
from the date the cause of action accrued, the Pennsylvania plaintiff
would be denied any forum to litigate. The result would be dictated
by the West Virginia court's application of its own two-year statute
since a forum generally applies its own "procedural" law.
124
Choice of Law
Whenever a case involving parties or transactions from two or more
states comes before a court, a decision has to be made as to which
state's law to apply. Many times this is easily resolved because the law
of all concerned states is identical. Problems arise, however, when
the laws differ. One state, for example, may limit recovery on a wrong-
ful death action while another does not; one may provide that con-
tributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery while in another it
is only a limitation; or one state may hold manufacturers of consumer
goods to only a negligence standard of care while another provides for
a strict liability.
Currently there are two methods used to resolve these conflict of
laws problems, lex loci and interest analysis. The lex loci rule is well
stated by Chief Justice Bell in his dissenting opinion in Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc.:
25
For over 100 years the law of Pennsylvania has been clearly
settled, namely, the substantive rights of the parties, as well as
the damages recoverable are governed by the law of the place
of the wrong or as it is sometimes expressed, the law of the place
where the injury occurred-lex loci delicti.126 (Emphasis original.)
In Griffith Pennsylvania adopted the modern methodology of interest
analysis. Essentially, this permits a court to examine the policies of
each state's laws and relevant state interests to determine, first, if in
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 65.1 (Supp. 1965).
123. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12 (1959).
124. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) it was held that a state
could constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations to a foreign based cause of
action. See also H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLEs, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (4th ed.
1964).
125. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
126. Id. at 26, 203 A.2d at 808.
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fact a real conflict 127 of laws exists, and, if so, which interest should be
furthered by the appropriate choice of law.
If a real conflict is found to exist, the jurisdictional issue becomes
crucial for it has been suggested that in such an instance a court should
presumptively apply its own law. 12 Moreover, the choice influencing
considerations include a state's governmental interest. 29 Thus, where
two states have an "interest" in the outcome of the litigation the
plaintiff who is able to choose his forum may often dictate the
terms of his recovery.
On the other hand, a plaintiff forced to litigate in a lex loci state
may find that forum enforcing rules limiting his recovery which in
no way further the policies or interests of any state.
Hypothetical Cases
The following illustrations demonstrate how the legislature by
failing to provide for adequate long-arm jurisdiction may send plain-
tiff and possibly the outcome of his litigation to a foreign court.
(1) An Oregon statute provides that contracts entered into by a
spendthrift for whom a guardian has been appointed shall be voidable
by the guardian.1 0 Pennsylvania has no such provision. D, an Oregon
spendthrift, flies to Pennsylvania. There he negotiates and signs a
promissory note in favor of P, a Pennsylvania resident. The note is
executed and delivered in Pennsylvania. D repays the note by a per-
sonal check which is returned because of insufficient funds. P had no
knowledge that D was under a spendthrift guardianship.
127. See, Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657 (1959).
Pennsylvania found a "false conflict" in Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897
(1966) where D, a friend, was flying P to Florida when the plane crashed in Georgia.
Georgia required guests to demonstrate gross negligence; Pennsylvania required only
negligence. The court noted that Georgia's policies of protecting insurers from collusive
suits and defendants from suits by "ungrateful" guests were unaffected since D and P
were residents of Pennsylvania, the forum.
These facts can be "flipped" to create a real conflict. P and D are Georgia residents
flying to New York when the plane crashes in Pennsylvania. Georgia now has an interest
as does Pennsylvania with its higher standard of care designed to control conduct and
provide a fund for local creditors. See Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966) where in a similar fact situation the court applied the
law of the place of the accident.
128. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes In The Conflict of Laws-Towards A Theory of Enter-
prise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960). Wisconsin
first adopted this approach giving lex fori an "analytical primacy." Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). However, more recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court
said that lex fori would no longer be "a choice-influencing consideration as such" but
would be "a weak presumption to be used as a starting point in applying the choice of
law rule...." Zelinger v. State Sand and Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 106, 156 N.W.2d 466,
469 (1968).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967).
130. ORE. REV. STAT. § 126.280 (1961).
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Based upon these facts, the Oregon Supreme Court has applied its
spendthrift statute and voided the contract. 81 It seems clear that
given this situation Pennsylvania's general policy of enforcing con-
tracts would be upheld by a Pennsylvania court. Additionally, appli-
cation of Pennsylvania law would appear proper in view of the fact
that D entered the state and executed a contract which was to be
performed here.
(2) D, a New York corporation, writes P, a resident of Pennsyl-
vania, asking that he come to New York to negotiate a contract for P
to render certain services for D in Pennsylvania for a period of two
years. An oral agreement to this effect is reached. D breaches the
contract. Pennsylvania has no statute of frauds rule to cover such a
contract but the New York statute requires a writing. 132
In the New York court D would plead the New York statute of
frauds as a defense to the contract while P would argue that Pennsyl-
vania law should apply. Without speculating as to the result the New
York Court would reach, it is clear that New York has an interest in
the litigation and could constitutionally apply its own law. Given these
facts, a Pennsylvania court might be more prone to look to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the contract; the fact that D asked P to travel
to New York to negotiate a contract which was to be performed in
Pennsylvania. Consequently P's claim might come before a more sym-
pathetic court if access to a Pennsylvania forum were possible.
(3) The same facts as example (2) except that D is an Ohio corpo-
ration and suit is brought in an Ohio court. The Ohio statute of
frauds, 133 like New York's, requires a writing for contracts not to be
performed within a year. Ohio, unlike New York, is a lex loci state34
and it would apply its own law for the contract was executed there.
(4) D, a Maryland partnership, solicits and sells pleasure boats in
the Pennsylvania market through independent contractors. P, a Penn-
sylvania resident, purchases one of D's boats and while sailing it on a
Maryland lake is killed as a result of the negligent design of the boat.
Maryland has interpreted its survival act as allowing damages only
for decedent's conscious pain and suffering 13 5 while Pennsylvania
permits recovery for "the present worth of decedent's likely earnings
131. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
132. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1964).
133. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1335.05.
134. Gorranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 5 Ohio Misc. 106, 345 F.2d 750 (1963).
135. Tri-State Poultry Co-op v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 57 A.2d 812 (1948).
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during his life expectancy, diminished by the probable cost of his
own maintainence during the time he would have lived."'136 Mary-
land, a lex loci state, ' 7 would apply its own limitation though if suit
could be brought in Pennsylvania a substantial recovery would be
possible. 138
(5) D, an individual, operates a nightclub in New Jersey just
across the Pennsylvania state line. He advertises extensively in Penn-
sylvania newspapers and a substantial amount of his business is com-
prised of Pennsylvania clientele. P and X, Pennsylvania residents,
travel to D's nightclub where D sells liquor to both men though they
are visibly intoxicated. Returning home they are involved in an
automobile accident. The Pennsylvania dram shop act as interpreted
makes a tavern owner negligent per se for the sale of liquor to any
person visibly intoxicated. 13 9 New Jersey has no dram shop act.
A real conflict is presented but it is believed that given these facts
a Pennsylvania court with personal jurisdiction over D may apply
the Pennsylvania statute. However, a New Jersey court would almost
certainly refuse to apply Pennsylvania law.
(6) P, a Pennsylvania resident, while traveling in New England
buys an "unbreakable" glass coffeepot from D, a single proprietorship
and manufacturer located in Connecticut. D advertises for mail orders
in several national magazines and does a considerable amount of mail
order business along the East Coast, including Pennsylvania. P re-
turns home and eventually takes the coffeepot to West Virginia for
use in her cottage where it explodes causing injury. There is no evi-
dence of negligence.
Pennsylvania 40 and Connecticut' 4 ' impose strict liability on dis-
tributors in such cases, while West Virginia follows a negligent stan-
dard.142 Unlike Pennsylvania, Connecticut and West Virginia are
lex loci and "last act" states.143 Thus, if suit were brought in either
136. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 7, 203 A.2d 796, 798 (1964).
137. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
138. New York, acting as neutral forum in a situation somewhat similar to that
presented, has applied Pennsylvania law. Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
266 N.Y.S. 2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965). Significantly, however, D was not a Maryland
defendant.
139. Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
140. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (approving Section 402A of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
141. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965), (approving Section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
142. See, Saena v. Zenith Optical Co., 135 W.Va. 795, 65 S.E.2d 205 (1951).
143. In Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) the court rejected
interest analysis for lex loci. In Rogers v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Co., 249 F.2d
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Connecticut or West Virginia, the law of West Virginia would be ap-
plied. Yet, this is a classic false conflict for West Virginia's policy of
protecting its merchants and manufacturers would be in no way af-
fected by the adoption of the higher standard of care imposed by
both P's and D's home states.
Conclusion
The above examples demonstrate that plaintiff's travel to an out-
of-state forum may not only be inconvenient, but may also result in
the loss of his substantive rights which the legal system of Pennsylvania
has indicated he is entitled to. In each of the above instances due
process would have allowed the assertion of jurisdiction under a suf-
ficiently broad statute. A Pennsylvania resident's substantive rights
should not be lost merely because his cause of action fortuitously falls
within a category for which the legislature has provided no long-arm
jurisdiction. This, it is submitted, is an unconscionable hardship.
A SUGGESTED REMEDY-A COMPREHENSIVE LONG-ARM
The preceding discussion points to the inadequacies of Pennsyl-
vania long-arm jurisdiction. Judge Davis's comment that Section 2011
of the Business Corporation Law as interpreted is an "outmoded
anomaly"'144 was certainly well taken. Justice O'Brien's observation
in denying jurisdiction under Section 331 that the legislature has
"been erring too much on the side of safety"'145 strikes to the crux of
the problem. Indeed, the legislature has been remiss in failing to pro-
vide its residents with the just protection afforded residents in nearly
every other state.
Section 2011 in its present form will very likely raise serious ques-
tions of interpretation. Moreover, it still fails to encompass the full
scope of in personam jurisdiction allowed by due process. 146 Section
331 has undergone attempts to broaden its application to cases never
envisioned by the General Assembly when it enacted the statute in
1937. That such attempts have been only partially successful may pos-
sibly be a result of a feeling on the court that legislative action would
262 (2d Cir. 1957) the court said the place of the accident (the "last act'), and not the place
of the negligence controlled. This is consistent with West Virginia law. Dallas v. Whitney,
118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936). See Note, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 350 (1967).
144. Rachelson v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 257, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
145. Messick v. Gordon, 434 Pa. 30, 34, 252 A.2d 627, 630 (1969).
14G. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
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be generated if it failed to interpret the section beyond its restrictive
provisions.
Pennsylvania jurisdiction over non-corporate entities is, at best, in-
effective beyond the nonresident motorist cases. It is strongly urged
that the Pennsylvania legislature react quickly and meaningfully to
this generally neglected area of Pennsylvania Law. To do this neces-
sitates the enactment of a comprehensive long-arm. We shall proceed to
critically examine approaches taken in other jurisdictions and ulti-
mately suggest a statute for Pennsylvania. Our bases of discussion will
be the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act.147
Jurisdiction to Extent of Due Process
Two states presently subject non-resident defendants to the juris-
diction of their courts to the extent permitted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 While the writers of this
note wrestled with the thought that such a statute would best serve
Pennsylvania interests, we have concluded that its uncertainty is too
great and that a well conceived long-arm would be more useful.
The Uniform Act
Section 1.01 provides the following:
As used in this Article, "person" includes an individual, his
executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a
corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or com-
mercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this
state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state.
Section 1.03 provides for specific jurisdiction in instances where a
cause of action arises directly from defendant's activities. The section
states:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim
for relief] arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this
state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or en-
147. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT. [Hereinafter referred to
as UNIFORM ACT.]
148. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1962). N.J. Rules Civ. Proc. 4:4.
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gages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives sub-
stantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in this state[; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk lo-
cated within this state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this
section, only a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts
enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
(1) Transacting any Business within the State
The Commissioners of the Uniform Act intended that this section
be given an "expansive interpretation."' 4 9 If adopted, the section
would do much to clear the murky waters of Section 2011C. The
legislature should make it clear that "transacting any business" is
much broader than the concept of "doing business" as defined by the
Pennsylvania cases.' 150
(2) Contracting to Supply Services or Things in This State
As is apparent by the wording of the section its coverage would in-
clude any isolated business transaction. In Pennsylvania jurisdiction
in such a case is presently unavailable. 151 Significantly, the section
would appear to cover products liability cases where pursuant to a
contract defendant ships his negligently designed product to a resident
in the state.
152
Subsection two is not as broadly framed as other jurisdictional
statutes. It would not apply to contracts where the nonresident de-
fendant is either (1) the party who has contracted for the plaintiff to
supply services within the state, or (2) the buyer rather than the sup-
plier of goods.'5 It is therefore believed that subsection two should
be changed to parallel the Minnesota provision which allows jtris-
149. UNsoaM ACT § 1.03 Commissioners' Notes. For an extended discussion of Illinois'
"transacting any business" provision see Currie at 560-581.
150. See e.g., LA. Rav. STAT. § 13.3201, Comment (d) (Supp. 1964).
151. See notes 68 to 71, supra, and accompanying text.
152. Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents-The Louisiana "Long-Arm"
Statute, 40 TUL. L. Ray. 366, 382 (1966). But see, Hill v. Morgan Power Apparatus Corp.,
239 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Ark. 1966), afl'd mem., 386 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1966).
West Virginia's long-arm, W. VA. CODE 3-1-71 (Supp. 1969) providing for jurisdiction over
an unregistered corporation which "makes a contract to be performed in whole or in part
by any party thereto in this state..." has been applied in a products liability case. Harford
v. Smith, 257 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. W. Va. 1966).
153. Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. King Bee Manufacturing Co., 24 Wis. 2d 459, 129
N.W.2d 237 (1964) (jurisdiction allowed over the nonresident buyer of goods).
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diction over nonresidents based on any contract made with a resident
of the state to be performed in whole or in part by either party within
the state.
5 4
(3) Causing Tortious Injury by an Act or Omission in this State
The Commissioners felt that this section was narrower in scope
than that of states such as Illinois which provides for jurisdiction
following "the commission of a tortious act within this state,"' 55 or
Vermont, which permits jurisdiction when "such foreign corporation
commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont.'
15 6
The Uniform Act clearly limits jurisdiction to situations where
the tortious act or omission occurs within the state, and there would
be no constitutional difficulty in asserting jurisdiction in such a situ-
ation. Indeed, Pennsylvania already has limited provisions for such
assertions of jurisdiction in its Motorists, Vessel, and Airplane stat-
utes. 57 The Commissioners cited Nelson v. Miller'58 and Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corporation59 which involve negligent acts
by the nonresident defendant after he enters the state.
Illinois has construed its statute to include in-state injuries resulting
from out-of-state wrongs. 60 Vermont, on the other hand, has refused
to exercise jurisdiction under its statute where plaintiff merely alleged
that defendants negligently-produced product was put "into the stream
of commerce" elsewhere and subsequently injured plaintiff in Ver-
mont. It indicated, however, that the substantial use of the product
in Vermont would permit jurisdiction.' 6 '
154. MINN. STAT. § 303.13(l)(3) (1961).
As a caveat to this proposed section and to the statute generally we wish to make it
clear that it is inevitable that there be instances where a particular factual setting will fall
within the statute but to exercise jurisdiction would still be violative of due process. For
instance, if a small buyer in State X contracts there for a nationwide seller in State Y
to ship an insignificant purchase into State X, it is highly possible that State Y could not
constitutionally assert jurisdiction in a suit against the buyer. Thus, notwithstanding the
exactitude of any long-arm statute, there will be cases where the court must still examine
the nature and quality of defendant's acts to determine whether the "minimum contacts"
test of International Shoe is met.
155. UNIFORM ACT § 1.03, Commissioners' Notes. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(l)(b) (1963).
156. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958).
157. These acts are included in the appendix.
158. 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) discussed in the text at note 113, supra.
159. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) discussed in note 18, supra.
160. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). But in Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965),
cert. denied sub nom., 382 U.S. 905 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals refused to
allow jurisdiction in a foreign-act, local-injury situation based upon a similar tortious act
statute. Subsequently, the legislature amended its statute to include specific foreign-act,
local-injury situations. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
161. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
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Under the Uniform Act there would be no need to construe this
particular subsection of the statute to include the local-injury, foreign-
act situation since the act contains a specific provision dealing with that
situation. Our proposed long-arm statute similarly contains such a
provision for foreign-act, local-injury situations.
Maine, which interprets its statute to the limits of due process, pro-
vides for the commission of "a tortious act within the state resulting
in physical injury to person or property.
1 62
New York includes the tortious act language "except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act."'
63
It is submitted that the language of the Uniform Act and similar
acts is sufficient since it would clearly appear beyond constitutional
challenge and would provide more precise statutory guidelines for
the courts when combined with a suitable foreign-act, local-injury
statute.
(4) Causing Tortious Injury in this State by an Act or Omission
Outside this State If He Regularly Does or Solicits Business, or
Engages in Any Other Persistent Course of Conduct, or Derives
Substantial Revenue from Goods Used or Consumed or Services
Rendered, in this State
The relevant Pennsylvania provision is embodied in Subsection C
of Section 2011 of the Business Corporation Law as amended and as
yet has not been interpreted by an appellate court. The troublesome
provisions of the statute have been discussed at length above.
164
The Commissioners recognized that the rules set forth in this sec-
tion are more restrictive than the Illinois statute as interpreted in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation'6" and
the Michigan statute, which provides for jurisdiction for "The doing
or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state
resulting in an action for tort."' 66 Sharing the Commissioner's view
that statutes like Michigan's may violate due process in certain situ-
162. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704B (1964), interpreted in Foye v. Consolidated
Baling Machine Co., 229 A.2d 196 (Me. 1967).
163. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
164. See note 64, supra, and the accompanying text.
165. 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
166. Micu. STAT. ANN. § 27A.705(2). For similar provisions see 16 ARIZ. REV. STAT. 4(e)(2)
(1961) (causing "an event to occur in this state out of which the claim which is the
subject of the complaint arose"); W. VA. CODE 3-1-71 (Supp. 1969) (Commission of a tort
"in whole or in part in this state'); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704B (1964) ("commission of
a tortious act within this state resulting in physical injury to person or property.').
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ations, it is suggested that the legislature adopt as another clause to
subsection four, a New York provision allowing jurisdiction "when
defendant expects or should reasonably expect the act to have conse-
quences in the state and derives substantial revenue from [pervasive]
interstate or [any] international commerce."'167
(5) Having an Interest in, Using, or Possessing
Real Property in this State
Ironically, Pennsylvania is a pioneer in this type of legislation. In-
deed, as recently as 1959 only one other state-Illinois-had a similar
statute. 8 The Illinois statute, however, provides for jurisdiction fol-
lowing "any cause of action" arising from "the ownership, use, or
possession of any real estate situated within this state.' 69
The Commissioners rely on one case, Dubin v. City of Philadel-
phia,170 which prior to International Shoe held the limited Pennsyl-
vania statute constitutional. Dubin has been thoroughly discussed by
the writers as well.17' Maine and New York among others substan-
tially follow the Illinois statute. In Porter v. Nahas 72 the Illinois
act was held constitutional and the Uniform Act was held to be within
the bounds of due process in Bowsher v. Digby, 73 which quoted the
following passage of Developments-Jurisdiction:
Such a generalized provision [as that of Illinois] would, however,
also appear to be constitutional, even in the extreme situation
in which a nonresident owner and another nonresident contract
outside the state with respect to the property, because of the state's
recognized interest in the title to land within its borders in addi-
tion to the defendant's substantial relationship with the state. 74
167. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1966) does not include the words pervasive
preceding the word "interstate" or any preceding the word "international." We believe
that these additions are essential if due process is to be met in every products liability
case where the presence of defendant's product is his only contact with the state.
168. Note, 44 IOWA L. REV. 374, 375 (1959).
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(c) (1968).
170. 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938) discussed in the text at note 95, supra.
171. Currie at 579; Note, 44 IOWA L. REV. 374, 380 (1959); and Woods, The Uniform
Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 ARK. L. REV. 627, 648 (1969).
172. 35 Ill. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1st Dist. 1962), discussed in the text at note
115, supra.
173. 243 Ark. 799, 802, 422 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1968).
174. Developments-Jurisdiction at 948. It is doubtful whether the "extreme situation"
referred to would be constitutional. Suppose, for example, two nonresidents contracted
for the sale of real property located in Pennsylvania. One party breached, and the other
wanted to sue for damages. Pennsylvania would appear to have no interest in such a suit
unless it would affect title to the land and the contacts with the defendant would appear
to be insufficient.
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The Montana statute goes further allowing jurisdiction in "any
claim for relief" arising from "the ownership, use or possession of
any property, or any interest therein, situated within the state."175
As to personal property it would appear that its mere presence
within the state would be insufficient. 176 Professor Currie states that
it "is just as well" that the Illinois statute does not include personalty
since in some areas it would "raise problems" as to its constitutionality
and that most cases will probably "fall within the provisions concern-
ing torts or the transaction of business. "17
T
Some cases involving personalty have come before the courts but
the ultimate question is still "What minimum contacts will suffice?"' 78
Insofar as real property is concerned the Uniform Act would appear
desirable. The courts would be left to determine what "use" of real
property is adequate, but it is submitted that "use" should be broadly
construed to include licensees and even trespassers. 179
The personal property sections are unnecessary. The Commissioners
excluded such a provision because of "difficulties" that might be
posed in situations involving stolen property, conditional sales and
chattel mortgages.
8 0
(6) Contracting to \Insure any Person, Property, or Risk
Located Within this State at the Time of Contracting
It would be unnecessary to enact this section for Section 1005.2 of
Pennsylvania's Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act makes the In-
surance Commissioner the implied agent for service when the un-
registered insurer issues delivers, solicits, or collects premiums on
insurance contracts or transacts any insurance business in the state.','
General Jurisdiction
Section 1.02 of the Uniform Act provides for general jurisdiction as
to any cause of action "over a person domiciled in, organized under
175. MONT. REV. CODES ANN, 93-2702-4B(l)(c) (Supp. 1969).
176. Developments-Jurisdiction at 948.
177. Currie at 580.
178. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961) (sub-permittee's
operation of nonresident defendant's cars held sufficient); Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co.,
270 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1959) (owner of undivided interest in Texas oil lease not amenable
to suit there); Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959) (dictum
stating that ownership of dog by nonresident sufficient for due process in dog-bite case).
179. Here again, the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe will have to serve
as an outer limit and in some situations a licensee or trespasser may not be constitu-
tionally subjected to in personam jurisdiction.
180. UNIFORm AcT § 1.03, Commissioners' Notes.
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1005.2 (1949).
357
Duquesne Law Review
the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business" in
the state. The section would fail to encompass the situation where de-
fendant carries on continuous and systematic activity within the state
but is neither domiciled, registered, nor maintaines its principal place
of business there. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolodated Mining Com-
pany182 the Supreme Court made it clear that jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances could be exercised. Our suggested statute is taken com-
pletely from the Wisconsin long-arm. 88 It provides:
A court . . . has jurisdiction over a person . . . in any action
whether arising within or without this state, against a defendant
who ... is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within
this state, whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate,
or otherwise.
Forum Shopping and Vexatious Suits
Adoption of a comprehensive long-arm would greatly increase the
range of Pennsylvania jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Thus
plaintiffs will be given considerable leeway in the choice of their
forum. The danger of vexatious suits and the possible choice of an
unfavorable forum in terms of trial convenience necessitates that a
viable forum non conveniens doctrine be embodied in statutory
form. 8 4 It is believed that Section 1.05 of the Uniform Act is suffi-
cient for this purpose. It provides:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or
dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may
be just.
Another possible hazard accruing from long-arm legislation is that
plaintiffs will attempt to utilize the statutory provisions in cases where
they are clearly not applicable. The real danger lies in the fact that
nonresident defendants might be induced to settle the frivolous claim
rather than incurring the expenses of litigating the jurisdictional issue.
The Michigan'85 and Wisconsin"' statutes offer a solution to this
182. See note 15, supra, and accompanying text.
183. Wisc. STAT. § 262.05(l)(d) (1967).
184. Pennsylvania's forum non conveniens doctrine is discussed in Plum v. Tampax,
Inc., 399 Pa. 553, 160 A.2d 549 (1960).
185. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.741 (1962) provides for defendant's compensation for all
costs except attorney's fees whenever plaintiff loses on the merits.
186. WIs. STAT. § 262.20(1) (1963) allows recovery of up to $500 when plaintiff's cause
of action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as reimbursement for litigation expenses.
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problem. Our suggested provision is included below as section 1.5
entitled "Defendant's Costs In Certain Cases."
Proposed Pennsylvania Statute
The following comprehensive long-arm statute is proposed for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:18
7
Section 1.1. "PERSON" DEFINED.-As used in this Article,
"person" includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or
other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, as-
sociation or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not
a citizen or domiciliary of this Commonwealth and whether or
not organized under the laws of this Commonwealth.
Section 1.2. PERSONAL JURISDICTION BASED UPON CONDUCT.-
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to any cause of action arising from
the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) making a contract with a resident of this state to be per-
formed in whole or in part by either party in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this
state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state, or expects or should reasonably expect
the act or omission to have consequences in the state and de-
rives substantial revenue from pervasive interstate or any in-
ternational commerce;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in this state
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this
section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in
this section may be asserted against him.
Section 1.3. GENERAL JURISDICTION.-A court may exercise
jurisdiction over a person who is engaged in substantial and not
isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are
wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.
Section 1.4. INCONVENIENT FoRuM.-When the court finds
that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be
heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action
in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
187. Our proposed statute deals only with substantive provisions of the long-arm itself.
Matters such as the service requirements and pleading are not discussed.
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Section 1.5. DEFENDANT'S COSTS IN CERTAIN CASES.-In all
civil actions initiated under Section 1.2 or 1.3 of this Act, or
under Section 1005.2 of the Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act,
the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, require plaintiff
to post a bond in the sum fixed by the court. Upon a judgement
in favor of defendant on the question of in personam jurisdiction,
so much of the bond as may be required shall be applied to the
satisfaction of any judgment for defendant's court costs and any
other actual expenses, excluding attorney's fees, incurred by de-
fendant in his defense of the action. In addition, on the condi-
tions here stated, the court may also grant to defendant his actual
and reasonable attorney's fees.
Attorney's fees shall be awarded if another forum was more con-
venient for plaintiff and defendant and the bulk of the trial con-
veniences were located elsewhere.
Attorney's fees shall not be awarded if:
(a) plaintiff had no other reasonably available forum; or
(b) plaintiff resided in this state and a substantial number of trial
conveniences were located within this state; or
(c) defendant conducted a substantial amount of business and
maintained officers or agents within this state.
In all other cases, the court shall consider the inconvenience to
the defendant and determine whether or not plaintiff's assertion





PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1410. Civil suit arising out of aircraft accident; process.
(a) That from and after the passage of this act any nonresident of this Commonwealth,
being the operator or owner of any aircraft, who shall accept the privilege, extended by
the laws of this Commonwealth to nonresident operators and owners, of operating an air-
craft, or of having the same operated over or above the lands and waters of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, or of using its aviation facilities, or both, or any resident of this
Commonwealth, who shall subsequently become a nonresident of this Commonwealth,
being the operator or owner of any aircraft over or above the lands and water of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, make and constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his, her, or their agent for the service of process in
any civil suit or proceeding instituted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
or in the United States courts in Pennsylvania against such operator or owner of such
aircraft arising out of, or by reason of, any accident or collision, occurring within or
above the Commonwealth, in which such aircraft is involved.
(b) A nonresident operator, or owner, of an aircraft which is involved in an accident
or collision within or above this Commonwealth, shall be deemed to have consented that
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the appointment of the Secretary of the Commonwealth as his agent for the service of
process, pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall be irrevocable and binding upon
his personal representative, executor or administrator. Where the nonresident operator
or owner of aircraft has died, prior to the commencement of an action brought pursuant
to this section, service of process shall be made on the personal representative, executor
or administrator of such nonresident operator or owner of aircraft in the same manner
and on the same notice as is provided in the case of a nonresident operator or owner of
aircraft. Where an action has been duly commenced, under the provisions of this section,
by service upon a defendant who dies thereafter, if the personal representative executor
or administrator of such defendant does not voluntarily become a party, he may be
substituted as a party under the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure, and service of
process shall be made in the same manner and on the same notice as is provided in the
case of a nonresident operator or owner of aircraft.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331. Actions against non-residents which involve real estate.
From and after the passage of this act, any nonresident of this Commonwealth being
the owner, tenant, or user, of real estate located within the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, and the footways and curbs adjacent thereto, or any such resident of this Common-
wealth who shall subsequently become a nonresident, shall, by the ownership, possession,
occupancy, control, maintenance, and use, of such real estate, footways, and curbs, make
and constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his, her, its, or their
agent for the service of process in any civil action or proceedings instituted in the courts of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against such owner, tenant, or user of such real estate,
footways, and curbs, arising out of or by reason of any accident or injury occurring within
the Commonwealth in which such real estate, footways, and curbs are involved.
§ 336. Nonresident owner or operator of vessel.
Any nonresident of this ommonwealth, being the owner or operator of any vessel, who
shall accept the privilege, extended by the laws of this Commonwealth to nonresident
operators and owners, of operating a vessel in the waters of this Commonwealth or of
using its port facilities or ports, or both, or any resident of this Commonwealth who shall
subsequently become a nonresident of this Commonwealth, being the operator or owner
of any vessel in the waters of this Commonwealth, shall, by the operation of a vessel in
the waters of the Commonwealth or of using its port facilities or ports, make and con-
stitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth his agent for the service of process in any civil
suit or proceeding instituted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or in
the United States Courts in Pennsylvania against such operator or owner of such vessel
arising out of, or by reason of, any accident or collision, occurring within the waters of
the Commonwealth in which such vessel is involved.
§ 338. Nonresident seller of malt or brewed beverages.
Any nonresident person or foreign association, partnership or corporation, whose products
are listed and sold through Pennsylvania Liquor Stores or who sells or distributes malt or
brewed beverages to any distributor or importing distributor licensed and doing business
within this Commonwealth, shall, for the privilege of having such products sold within
this Commonwealth, constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth as his agent in the
Commonwealth, upon whom process may be served in the event of any litigation that might
arise in Pennsylvania over the sale, use or handling of such products in the manner pre-
scribed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for service of process upon defendants
who are nonresidents or who conceal their whereabouts: Provided, however, That nothing
contained herein shall be applicable to or change the requirements of the act of April 12,
1951 (P.L. 90), known as the "Liquor Code", as amended and the regulation of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board adopted under authority conferred by said act with
respect to the service of process in proceedings instituted by the said board against non-
resident persons, foreign associations, partnerships and corporations, whose products are
listed and sold in Pennsylvania liquor stores and who sell malt and brewed beverages to
importing distributors licensed and doing business in this Commonwealth.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011. B. Any foreign business corporation which shall have done
any business in this Commonwealth, without procuring a certificate of authority to do so
from the Department of State, shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the
Secretary of the Commonwealth as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on
its behalf, service of process in any action arising within this Commonwealth. On petition,
alleging conduct of business within the Commonwealth by any corporation not qualified
by the Secretary of the Commonwealth or having otherwise designated him as agent for the
service of process, the court of the county in which the action is instituted shall authorize
service to be made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Service shall be made by
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the sheriff of such county, by transmitting to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and to
the defendant at his last known residence or place of business, by registered mail, return
receipt requested, a copy of such process, together with a copy of the petition and order
of the court, properly certified as such by the prothonotary. The return receipt by the post
office department shall be evidence of service under this act. Where process is issued against
any such foreign business corporation by any court of the United States empowered to issue
such process under the laws of the United States, the Secretary of the Commonwealth is
authorized to receive such process in the same manner as herein provided for process issued
by courts of this Commonwealth. Nothing herein contained shall limit or affect the right to
serve any process, notice or demand, required or permitted by law to be served upon a
foreign corporation, in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law.
C. For the purposes of determining jurisdictions of courts within this Commonwealth,
the doing by any corporation in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the
purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or
doing a single act in this Commonwealth for such purpose, with the intention of thereby
initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute "doing business." For the purposes of this
subsection the shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Com-
monwealth shall be considered the doing of such an act in this Commonwealth.
D. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction of courts within this Commonwealth,
inspecting, appraising and acquiring real estate and mortgages, and other liens thereon,
and personal property and security interests therein, and holding, leasing away, conveying
and transferring the same, as fiduciary or otherwise, or collecting debts and enforcing
mortgages and rights in property securing the same by any foreign business corporation
shall not constitute "doing business."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40. § 1005.2 Service of process upon unauthorized insurer.
(a) Any of the following acts in this State effected by mail or otherwise by an unau-
thorized insurer of another state or foreign government: (1) the issuance or delivery of
contracts of insurance to residents of this State or to corporations authorized to do business
therein; (2) the solicitation of applications for such contracts; (3) the collection of premiums,
membership fees, assessments, or other considerations, for such contracts; or (4) any other
transaction of insurance business, is equivalent to and shall constitute an appointment by
such insurer of the Insurance Commissioner and his successor or successors in office to be
its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action,
suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of an insured or beneficiary arising out of
any such contract of insurance, and any such act shall be signification of its agreement that
such service of process is of the same legal force and validity as personal service of process
in this State upon such insurer.
(b) Such service of process shall be made by delivering to and leaving with the In-
surance Commissioner or his deputy two copies thereof and the payment to him at the
time of said service the sum of two ($2) dollars. The Insurance Commissioner shall forth-
with mail, by registered mail, one of the copies of such process to the defendant at its
last known principal place of business and shall keep record of all process so served upon
him. Such service of process is sufficient, provided notice of such service upon the In-
surance Commissioner and a copy of the process are sent within ten days thereafter, by
registered mail, by plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney to the defendant at its last known
principal place of business and the defendant's receipt or receipt issued by the post-office
with which the letter is registered, showing the name of the sender of the letter and
the name and address of the person to whom the letter is addressed, and the affidavit
of the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney showing a compliance herewith, are filed with the
prothonotary or clerk of the court in which such action is pending on or before the
date the defendant is required to appear or within such further time as the court may
allow.
(c) Service of process in any such action, suit or proceeding shall, in addition to the
manner provided in subsection (b) of this section, be valid if served upon any person
within this State who in this State on behalf of such insurer is-
(1) soliciting insurance, or
(2) making, issuing or delivering any contract of insurance, or
(3) collecting or receiving any premium, membership fee, assessment or other considera-
tion for insurance, and a copy of such process is sent within ten days after such service,
by registered mail, by the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney to the defendant at the last
known principal place of business of the defendant and the defendant's receipt or the
receipt issued by the post-office with which the letter is registered, showing the name of
the sender of the letter and the name and address of the person to whom the letter is
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addressed, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney showing a compliance
herewith, are filed with the prothonotary or the clerk of the court in which such action
is pending on or before the date the defendant is required to appear or within such
further time as the court may allow.
(d) No plaintiff or complainant shall be entitled to a judgment by default or otheriwse
until the expiration of thirty days from date of the filing of the affidavit of compliance.
(e) Nothing in this section contained shall limit or abridge the right to serve any
process, notice or demand upon any insurer in any other manner now or hereafter per-
mitted by law.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 2001. Service; Secretary of Commonwealth as agent; personal
representative; party.
(a) From and after the passage of this act, any nonresident of this Commonwealth, being
the operator or owner of any motor vehicle or motor boat, or being a person in whose
behalf a motor vehicle or motor boat is being operated whether or not such person is the
operator or owner, who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of this Common-
wealth to nonresident operators and owners of operating a motor vehicle or motor boat,
or of having the same operated, within or on inland or tidal waters of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, or any resident of this Commonwealth, being the licensed operator or
owner of any motor vehicle or motor boat under the laws of this Commonwealth, or being
a person in whose behalf a motor vehicle or motor boat is being operated whether or not
such person is the operator or owner, who shall subsequently become a nonresident or
shall conceal his whereabouts, shall, by such acceptance or licensure, as the case may be,
and by the operation of such motor vehicle or motor boat within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, make and constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania his, her, or their agent for the service of process in any civil suit
or proceeding instituted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or in the
United States District Courts of Pennsylvania against such operator or owner of such
motor vehicle or motor boat or person in whose behalf such motor vehicle or motor boat
is being operated whether or not such person is the operator or owner, arising out of, or
by reason of, any accident or collision occurring within or on inland or tidal waters of the
Commonwealth in which such motor vehicle is involved.
(b) A nonresident operator, owner, or person in whose behalf such motor vehicle or
motor boat is being operated whether or not such person is the operator or owner, of a
motor vehicle or motor boat which is involved in an accident or collision within or on
inland or tidal waters of this Commonwealth, shall be deemed to have consented that the
appointment of the Secretary of the Commonwealth as his agent for the service of process,
pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall be irrevocable and binding upon his per-
sonal representative, executor or administrator. Where the nonresident motorist, owner or
operator has died, prior to the commencement of an action brought pursuant to this sec-
tion, or subsequent to the commencement of an action but prior to service, service of
process shall be made on the personal representative, executor or administrator of such
nonresident motorist, owner or operator in the same manner and on the same notice as
is provided in the case of a nonresident motorist, owner or operator. Where an action
has been duly commenced, under the provisions of this section, by service upon a defendant
who dies thereafter, if the personal representative, executor or administrator of such de-
fendant does not voluntarily become a party, he may be substituted as a party under the
applicable Rules of Civil Procedure, and service of process shall be made in the same
manner and on the same notice as is provided in the case of a nonresident motorist, owner
or operator.
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